“The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb”


Henry Stimson’s argument in support of using the atomic bomb against the Japanese may have been accepted at the time, although in retrospect, appears to be based upon false premises. Stimson speaks of the will of the Japanese to continue fighting and the potential to save American lives through the use of a weapon that could shock the enemy into submission. This stance appears to have been unnecessary since there were alternative scenarios that would have brought about an abrupt end to the war, apart from the use of nuclear arms. Russia’s mid-August entry into the war would have been sufficient to convince Japanese leaders that surrender was inevitable. Although Stimson speaks of a Japanese army five million strong, their military position was so poor that its leaders would likely have surrendered before an American invasion even took place. They possessed no sea or air support which would render Japanese forces ineffective and susceptible to bombs, bullets, disease, and starvation.

Soviet entry in mid-August would have made use of the bombs unnecessary, and if they were not used by that time, they would not have been used at all. Stimson neglects to mention the ulterior role that the bomb played, specifically as a means of intimidation towards the Russians. In Stimson’s diary, he refers to the atomic bomb as the “master card” of diplomacy with Russia, and that the weapon must be demonstrated before sparring with Russia. Furthermore, the claim that the bomb prevented over a million American casualties is a completely unrealistic figure. The maximum American death toll in the event of a full scale invasion is estimated to be closer to 46,000, which is nowhere near the figure cited by Stimson.

In Truman’s defense, his experience in battle during World War I likely provided him with the ability to empathize with the soldiers who served on the front lines, which could have influenced him to take precautions to prevent further American deaths. Nevertheless, it appears that the decision to use the atomic bomb was greatly influenced by the small window of opportunity available to use the weapon, the funds and manpower expended on its production and most importantly, its role as a display of strength and intimidation in the international community. Regardless of Stimson’s claims that the bomb was used solely as an instrument for shortening the war and minimizing destruction, the ability for the weapon to bring about an end to the war appears to have been merely a secondary concern.

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2 Responses to “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb”

  1. Rebecca Peters says:

    I think you raise several interesting points. It seems to me that uncertainty is one of America’s only acceptable explanations. While it certainly appears as though the Japanese would have surrendered if Russia declared war, there was no guarantee.

  2. Andrew Schneider says:

    I personally agree that the primary motive for the bombs’ use was not ending the war, but as a way to intimidate other nations through a show of military might. However, this thought does beg the question of why two bombs were needed. It becomes evident after asking this that there was more to the equation then proving the US had the most devastating weaponry and that maybe it is plausible that US officials felt the war was not nearing an end.

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